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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over part of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), and properly transferred this appeal to this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), giving this Court partial jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). The District Court entered its final Order and 
Judgment dismissing this action with prejudice on August 30, 1999 [R. 398-400, 
Appellant's Addendum ("Aplt. Add.") 4, 5]. Plaintiff-appellant Wydredge, L.L.C. 
("Wydredge"), timely filed its Notice of Appeal from the final Order/Judgment on 
September 9, 1999 (R. 401-402), pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 3(a). 
Appellant's Brief indicates Wydredge is also purporting to appeal from the 
District Court's Order Denying Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens pending appeal 
(Aplt. Add. 7).1 However, Wydredge did not file a notice of appeal as to this Order or 
the November 30, 1999 Minute Entry. In addition, Wydredge's attempted appeal from 
this Order is moot, because, after the District Court's Minute Entry denying 
Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens, Wydredge did not seek a stay from 
the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 8(a), and instead signed a 
Release of Lis Pendens on January 5, 2000, which was recorded on January 6, 2000 
[Appellees' Addendum ("Aple. Add.") A]. After releasing the lis pendens, Wydredge 
then filed a Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens in this Court in February 2000. 
Apparently this Order was never entered by the District Court, as it does not appear in 
the record on appeal. However, the District Court did enter a November 30, 1999 
Minute Entry to the same effect (R. 426-427, Aplt. Add. 6). 
1 
Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to that motion, and the motion is under 
advisement. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the December 1, 1997 letter agreement ("Letter") 
between plaintiff-appellant Wydredge and defendants-appellees Airport Partners, 
L.L.C. ("Airport Partners") and J. Brent Parrish ("Parrish") (Airport Partners and 
Parrish are sometimes referred to herein collectively as "defendants") was too vague 
and illusory, and contained insufficient material terms with regard to the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties thereunder, in order to create an enforceable contract. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Wydredge correctly states the standard of 
review applicable to this issue in the second paragraph on page 2 of Appellant's Brief. 
ISSUE NO- 2: Whether Wydredge's purported appeal from the District 
Court's denial of Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens pending appeal is 
barred because Wydredge failed to file a notice of appeal regarding the denial of the 
Motion. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Not applicable. 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether Wydredge's purported appeal from the District 
Court's denial of Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens pending appeal is 
moot, because, after the District Court's denial of Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release 
of Lis Pendens, Wydredge did not seek a stay from the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant 
to Utah R. App. P. 8(a), and instead released the lis pendens before filing its Motion to 
Stay Release of Lis Pendens in this Court. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: Not applicable. (Defendants also raised this 
issue in their memorandum in opposition to the motion to stay currently pending before 
this Court.) 
ISSUE NO- 4: Whether the District Court correctly ordered Wydredge to 
release the lis pendens, and correctly denied Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release of Lis 
Pendens. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the District Court correctly ordered 
the release of the lis pendens is subject to the same standard of review as Issue No. 1. 
Whether the District Court correctly denied the motion to stay is reviewable only for 
abuse of discretion. See, Utah R .Civ. P. 62; Poplar Grove Planting and Refining Co., 
Inc. v. Bache Halsev Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979); Bruce Church, 
Inc. v. Superior Court, 774 P.2d 818, 821 (Ariz. App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-126(l) states: "An operating agreement may be 
adopted with the unanimous consent of the members." (Emphasis added.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action by plaintiff Wydredge seeking to enforce an alleged contract 
with defendants to create an entity for purposes of constructing and operating a hotel on 
real property owned by defendants. The terms of the alleged contract are set forth in 
the December 1, 1997 Letter (R. 10-11, Aplt. Add. 1) as allegedly supplemented by 
parol evidence. Defendants contend that the Letter and any alleged supplementary 
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parol evidence were too vague and illusory, and contained insufficient material terms 
with regard to the rights and responsibilities of the parties thereunder, in order to create 
an enforceable contract. Defendants also contend that Wydredge is liable for certain 
architectural fees incurred by Wydredge in anticipation of developing defendants' real 
property, a portion of which fees defendants paid. 
Course of Proceedings 
Wydredge filed its Verified Complaint on October 3, 1998 (R. 1-25). The 
Verified Complaint contains four causes of action, as follows: 
(1) Seeking to impose a constructive trust on defendants' real property, 
based on the contract allegedly created by the Letter; 
(2) Seeking to require specific performance of the contract allegedly created 
by the Letter; 
(3) Seeking damages for alleged breach of the contract allegedly created by 
the Letter; and 
(4) Seeking damages on the basis that defendants were allegedly estopped 
from denying the existence of the contract allegedly created by the Letter. 
Shortly after filing the Verified Complaint, Wydredge also recorded a Notice of Lis 
Pendens against defendants' real property (R. 152-154). 
Defendants filed their Answer and Counterclaim on November 25, 1998 
(R. 30-38). In their Answer, defendants denied that the Letter created an enforceable 
contract. Defendants' Counterclaim alleged that Wydredge was liable for certain 
architectural fees incurred by Wydredge in anticipation of developing defendants' real 
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property, a portion of which fees defendants paid. Wydredge tiled a Reply to 
Counterclaim on December 11, 1998 (R. 39-42). 
After the parties conducted discovery, defendants filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on April 29, 1999 (R. 47-49), which the parties fully briefed (R. 
50-154, 156-334, 335-387). Defendants' Motion sought dismissal of Wydredge's 
Verified Complaint on the basis that the Letter did not create an enforceable contract. 
Defendants' Motion also sought an order that Wy dredge release the lis pendens, and 
judgment against Wy dredge on defendants' Counterclaim for the architectural fees. 
On August 2, 1999, the Court heard argument on defendants' Motion, and 
granted the portion of the Motion seeking dismissal of the Verified Complaint and 
release of the lis pendens. However, the Court denied the portion of the Motion 
seeking judgment on defendants' counterclaim (R. 397). The Court's Order and 
Judgment dismissing the entire action with prejudice and ordering the release of the lis 
pendens were entered on August 30, 1999 (R. 398-400, Aplt. Add. 4, 5). 
On September 9, 1999, Wydredge filed its Notice of Appeal (R. 401-402) 
and a Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens in the District Court (R. 405-406). The 
parties fully briefed Wydredge's Motion to Stay (R. 407-410, 415-419, 420-422), 
which the District court denied on November 5, 1999 (R. 426-427, Aplt. Add. 6). 
On January 5, 2000, Wydredge signed a Release of Lis Pendens, which was 
recorded on January 6, 2000 (Aple. Add. A). In February 2000, Wydredge filed a 
Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens in this Court, which defendants have opposed 
and which is under advisement. 
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Disposition in the District Court 
In the District Court's August 30, 1999 Order on defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 399-400, Aplt. Add. 4), the Court ruled as follows., in 
pertinent part: 
1. The December 1, 1997 letter agreement is vague and 
lacks sufficient material terms with regard to the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties thereunder, which renders the letter 
agreement unenforceable. Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, that the letter agreement is not an 
enforceable contract, is granted.2 
2. Because the December 1, 1997 agreement is not 
enforceable, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, with 
regard to the claim for reimbursement of costs and expenses, is 
denied.3 
2In response to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Wydredge argued only that 
the Letter, along with certain parol evidence, were sufficient to create an enforceable 
contract (R. 156-334), and repeats these arguments in its opening Brief before this 
Court. Because Wydredge made no separate arguments on its constructive trust or 
estoppel claims either in the District Court or this Court, any such arguments are 
waived. See, Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 
880 (Utah 1996). 
3Even though Wydredge had not filed its own motion for summary judgment on 
defendants' Counterclaim, this portion of the District Court's ruling necessarily resulted 
in dismissal of the Counterclaim as well, as reflected in the Judgment dismissing the 
entire action with prejudice (R. 398, Aplt. Add. 5). Although defendants did not cross 
appeal from the dismissal of their Counterclaim, if this Court were to reverse the 
District Court's ruling that the Letter is not an enforceable contract, this reversal would 
also reinstate defendants' Counterclaim, which is also based on the Letter. See, 
Halladav v. Cluff. 739 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah App. 1987), cert den., 765 P.2d 1277 
(Utah 1987): "Cross-appeals are properly limited to grievances a party has with the 
judgment as it was entered—not grievances it might acquire depending on the outcome 
of the appeal." 
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3. The Plaintiff has no interest in the property underlying 
the dispute between the parties. Accordingly, the lis pendens filed 
by the Plaintiff is improper and shall be removed by the Plaintiff.4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts in the record are not disputed:5 
1. Defendants purchased the real property upon which the parties later 
planned to build a hotel, on or about July 30, 1997. Defendants purchased the property 
from Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. ("Alamo") (R. 291). At the time of the purchase, Alamo 
was in the process of remediating petroleum groundwater contamination at the 
property, and agreed to indemnify defendants regarding that petroleum contamination 
(Parrish Depo.,6 pp. 6-8, R. 204). 
2. This remediation activity was readily apparent to Wydredge from the 
groundwater monitoring wells located on the property (Appellant's Brief, p. 8). Based 
on Alamo's assumption of responsibility for remediating the petroleum contamination, 
4Wydredge's memorandum in opposition to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R. 156-334) also made no separate argument in opposition to defendants' request that 
the District Court order the release of the lis pendens. Accordingly, any argument 
Wydredge is now making as to any alleged error in the portion of the District Court's 
Order that the lis pendens be released is also waived. See, Strawberry Electric Service 
District, supra. 
JWytfredge's statement of facts in its memorandum in opposition to defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R. 156-164) did not dispute the statement of Material Facts in 
defendants' memorandum in support of their motion (R. 52-62). Accordingly, 
defendants' facts are deemed admitted. See, Rule 4-501 (2)(B), Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. 
6For the court's information, Parrish is one of the named defendants and a 
representative of co-defendant Airport Partners. Cutrubus, Rumpsa, Wyman and 
Eldgredge are representatives of Wydredge. 
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and Alamo's indemnity, defendants indicated to Wy dredge that they did not believe the 
petroleum contamination would interfere with construction of a hotel on the property 
(Parrish Depo., p. 8, R. 204). 
3. During the fall of 1997, the parties began negotiating over the 
possibility of building a hotel on defendants' real property, as set forth on pages 3 and 
4 of the Statement of Facts in Appellant's Brief. The parties met on November 20, 
1997 (not 1998, as set forth in Appellant's Brief on p. 4), to discuss the status of their 
negotiations. On that same day, defendants faxed a memo to Wydredge summarizing 
the outcome of the meeting (R. 300, Aple. Add. B). 
4. The November 20, 1997 memo indicated that defendants were 
proposing to invest their real property, valued at $850,000, plus $650,000 cash, " . . . 
equaling a total maximum investment of $1,500,000 and nothing more . . . " (emphasis 
added) for a 49% interest in the project. The memo also indicated that the parties 
would " . . . participate 50/50 . . . in expenses incurred (architect, engineering, survey 
licensing, etc.) up to the first phase of construction." (Aple. Add. B, emphasis added). 
5. The November 20, 1997 memo went on to state that the parties " . . . 
have agreed to define an exit strategy for this project based upon mutually agreed to 
trigger mechanisms that would provide for the partners to elect to exit the project in 
whole or in part." Further, the memo stated: "A formal and legal agreement will be 
drawn and signed by all members prior to the first shovel being turned for this project." 
(Aple. Add. B, emphasis added.) 
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6. Wydredge prepared the December 1, 1997 Letter to defendants (which 
defendants also signed) in response to defendants' November 20, 1997 memo: "Thank 
you for your recap of the points agreed upon at our meeting" (R. 10, Aplt. Add. 1). 
The purpose of the November 30, 1997 meeting and the Letter was to create a 
procedure for determining the feasibility of the project (Rumpsa Aff., 11 1, 3, R. 169-
170; Wydredge's memorandum in opposition to defendants1 motion for summary 
judgment, p. 5, 1 21, R. 160; Appellant's Brief, p. 5). 
7. Paragraph 2 of the Letter stated: 
The feasibility of constructing on this site a hotel with 
approximately 100 rooms will be investigated. Such 
efforts will likely include, but not be limited to, 
obtaining preliminary indications of interest in project 
financing from qualified lenders, obtaining a preliminary 
appraisal, obtaining initial architectural plans, and 
possibly obtaining commitments regarding construction 
and term loan financing for the subject property. The 
two named partners. Airport Partners, L.L.C. and 
Wydredge, L.L.C., shall share the cost of all such 
efforts on a 49%-51% basis, respectively, which 
expenses will be paid by both partners as incurred. 
(Aplt. Add. 1, emphasis added). 
8. Paragraph 3 of the Letter stated: 
Upon the determination that such a lodging facility can 
be constructed on the subject parcel without any 
significant or unusual site costs and that financing can be 
obtained for 60% or more of the total projected cost as 
an interest rate not to exceed 1 % over prime relative to 
the term loan (minimum 15 year amortization and 5 year 
balloon), the undersigned parties will build and operate 
the subject hotel under the following terms and 
conditions. 
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(Aplt. Add. 1, emphasis added). 
9. The Letter then set forth five numbered "terms and conditions," 
including the following: 
1) A new entity will be formed with Airport Partners, 
L.L.C. holding 49% of such entity and Wydredge, 
L.L.C. holding 51 % of such entity. The operating 
agreement for this entity, or other similar agreement 
shall specify, among other things, terms under 
which one or more members may dispose of their 
interest. 
2) Airport Partners, L.L.C. and/or J. Brent Parrish 
will contribute $650,000 cash and no more, less 
expenses paid as described in paragraph two above. 
as necessary - when necessary, to such entity and 
contribute the subject property, valued at $850,000 
for purposes of this transaction . . . to equal a full 
49% share. 
(Aplt. Add. 1, emphasis added). The Letter went on to provide that one of Wydredge's 
responsibilities was to obtain financing for the project, over and above defendants1 cash 
contribution. (Id.) 
10. As admitted on page 10 of the Appellant's Brief, defendants were 
unwilling to commit the $650,000 in cash they had proposed to contribute until the 
"operating agreement," required by both Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter (Aplt. 
Add. 1) and defendants' November 20, 1997 memo, was signed. As stated in the 
November 20, 1997 memo: "A formal and legal agreement will be drawn and signed 
by all members prior to the first shovel being turned for this project" (Aple. Add. B). 
11. As also stated on page 10 of Appellant's Brief, Wydredge presented 
defendants with its proposed form of operating agreement for a new limited liability 
10 
company ("LLC") on April 2, 19987 (R. 309-313, Aplt. Add. 3). Wydredge's 
proposed operating agreement contained numerous provisions that were not contained 
either in defendants' November 20, 1997 memo or in Wydredge's December 1, 1997 
Letter, and to which defendants had never agreed. (Compare Aple Add. B, Aplt. Add. 
1, and Aplt. Add. 3). 
12. Accordingly, defendants indicated that they would not sign Wydredge's 
proposed operating agreement until after they had reviewed it with counsel. (Rumpsa 
Aff., 1 10, R. 173; R. 382). Paragraph 30 of Wydredge's statement of facts in its 
memorandum in opposition to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment admits: "A 
proposed operating agreement for Intermountain Lodging [the new LLC] was also 
submitted to Parrish but was unsigned because he had some unspecified objections" 
(R. 162). 
13. Under both defendants' November 20, 1997 memo (Aple. Add. B) and 
Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter (Aplt. Add. 1), defendants were not required to 
contribute any more than $650,000 in cash8 plus their real property, in return for a 
49% interest in the project. However, under Article V of Wydredge's proposed 
operating agreement, Wydredge could request additional capital contributions from 
defendants, and if defendants declined to make those contributions, Wydredge could 
7Wydredge never filed the Articles of Organization the parties signed regarding the new 
LLC (R. 306-307, Aplt. Add. 2). Accordingly, the new LLC was never formed or 
organized. See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2b-103(1) and 118(1). 
8As indicated at p. 11 of Appellants' Brief, defendants later proposed to reduce this 
amount to $200,000, and Wydredge proposed a corresponding reduction in defendants' 
interest in the project to 35 %. 
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make them instead, thereby diluting defendants' interest in the project (Aplt. Add. 3, 
R. 310). Thus, this provision was inconsistent with the Letter (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 
70-73, R. 194). 
14. Wydredge's proposed operating agreement also was silent as to the 
51%/49% split of initial costs required by the Letter (Aplt. Add. 1,3). 
15. Under Article X.A of Wydredge's proposed operating agreement, and 
Wydredge's understanding of the Letter, Wydredge could have immediately sold 
defendants' real property and received 51 %9 of the proceeds from the sale without 
contributing anything to the project (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 52-55, R. 189-190). 
16. After consulting with their counsel (Parrish Depo., pp. 27-29, R. 209), 
on or about May 29, 1998 defendants sent Wydredge their own proposed form of 
operating agreement (R. 318-328; Aple. Add. C). Among other things, defendants 
proposed that they would receive a 50% interest in the project, and greater participation 
in management than under Wydredge's proposed operating agreement (Aple. Add. C; 
Parrish Depo., p. 29, R. 209). 
17. Although the parties continued to negotiate, they never reached 
agreement on the form of an operating agreement (R. 330-334). 
18. Both defendants' November 30, 1997 memo (Aple. Add. B) and 
Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter (Aplt. Add. 1) required the parties to reach 
965% according to page 11 of Appellant's Brief, based upon the reduction in 
defendants' cash contribution to $200,000. 
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agreement on how the parties could "exit the project" or "dispose of their interest" in 
the project. No such agreement was ever reached (R. 330-334). 
19. According to Wydredge, the parties never had a meeting of the minds as 
to division of initial costs, including architectural fees, which were supposed to be split 
51 %/49% under the Letter. Valentiner and Crane Architects submitted an invoice for 
$81,830.80 in architectural fees related to proposed development of a hotel on 
defendants1 property (R. 142). Defendants paid $42,097.00, over 49% of that invoice. 
Wy dredge refused to pay the remaining portion of the invoice, contending that it was 
only responsible to pay $2,000 in architectural fees.10 (Cutrubus Depo. pp. 44-46, 92-
94, R. 187-188, 199-200; Wyman Depo. pp. 39-42, R. 224-225.) 
20. Defendants refunded the $2,000 in architectural fees Wy dredge paid 
(Parish Depo., p. 28, R. 209; R. 318). Accordingly, Wydredge has paid no costs 
towards development of a hotel on defendants' property (other than possibly the cost of 
a trip to Tucson, Arizona, to investigate hotel franchise opportunities for defendants, 
prior to defendants' November 30, 1997 memo) (Wyman Depo., pp.46-48, R. 226). 
21. Any financing commitment Wydredge allegedly obtained regarding the 
hotel development was not binding because Wydredge never signed it, and Wydredge 
never paid any of the amounts required to obtain such a commitment (Cutrubus Depo., 
pp. 40-41, R. 186). 
°Based on Wydredge's refusal to pay its share of the architect's fees, the architect has 
now sued all of the parties to the present action in the District Court, Civil No. 
000900224. This Court can take judicial notice of the architect's lawsuit. 
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22. Any financing commitment Wydredge allegedly obtained was subject to 
the lender's due diligence, including, among other things, an appraisal of defendants' 
real property (as also required by the Letter) and an environmental assessment of 
defendants' real property. Wydredge never obtained an appraisal or an environmental 
assessment, or provided estimated costs of construction to the proposed lender. 
(Cutrubus Depo., pp. 27-28, 32-37, 39-40, 66-68, R. 183-186, 193; Wyman Depo., 
pp. 26-28, R. 221). 
23. Wydredge's lender (First Security Bank) was concerned about 
environmental contamination at defendants' real property (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 32-37, 
R. 184-185). As discussed above, Alamo had assumed responsibility for petroleum 
contamination. However, during the unsuccessful negotiations with Wydredge over the 
form of the operating agreement, defendants learned of solvent contamination at the 
property, for which Alamo may not have assumed responsibility, and notified 
Wydredge accordingly (R. 140, 353-366, Parrish Depo., pp. 30-37, R. 210-211; 
Cutrubus Depo., pp. 84-85, R. 197; R. 330-334). 
24. It is unclear how this solvent contamination would affect development of 
defendants' real property and, in particular, whether this contamination would create 
any "significant or unusual site costs" that could prevent development of the property, 
within the meaning of the Letter (Aplt. Add. 1, Parrish Depo., pp. 30-37, R. 210-211; 
R. 330-334). 
25. Wydredge understood and agreed that if there were environmental 
problems with defendants' real property other than the petroleum contamination, these 
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problems might prevent development of the property (Rumpsa Aff. 1 3, R. 170; 
Cutrubus Depo., pp. 86-87, R. 198). 
26. The Letter was silent on numerous issues addressed in the respective 
operating agreements proposed by both Wydredge (Aplt. Add. 3) and defendants (Aple. 
Add. C), upon which the parties never agreed. These issues included the following: 
a. Wydredge's capital contribution (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 51-52, R. 
189). 
b. Repayment of defendants' capital contribution (Id.). 
c. Whether or when additional capital contributions would be required, 
and by whom. 
d. The appointment, identity, removal or replacement, and powers of 
the managing member of the proposed LLC. 
e. Division of profits or withdrawal of capital (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 50-
51, R. 189)." 
f. Payment of salaries or other compensation to the members of the 
proposed LLC. 
g. Transfer of a member's interest in the proposed LLC. 
h. Dissolution of the proposed LLC or sale of defendants' real 
property. 
1
 Wydredge's proposed operating agreement would have allowed Wydredge to 
withdraw capital without defendants' consent, but would not have allowed defendants to 
withdraw capital without Wydredge's consent (Aplt. Add. 3, Article VII; Cutrubus 
Depo., pp. 73-75, R. 194-195). Defendants never agreed to this proposal (Id.) 
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i. Loans by or to the proposed LLC or its members, 
j . Indemnification of the members of the proposed LLC. 
27. The Letter allowed Wydredge to back out of the proposed deal if 
Wydredge determined that the proposed hotel would not generate a sufficient level of 
profit (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 25-27, R. 182-183). 
28. Wydredge never made a determination whether to move forward with 
development of defendants1 real property (Cutrubus Depo., p. 92, R. 199). 
29. Wydredge recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens against defendants' real 
property in this action (R. 152-154). 
30. Wydredge recorded the lis pendens not because it was claiming an 
interest in the real property, but in order to stop any other development of the property. 
Wydredge has no interest in assuming any environmental liability that such an interest 
might create (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 87-89, 94-95, R. 198, 200). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter (along with defendants' November 20, 
1997 memo) were nothing more than unenforceable agreements to agree. The purpose 
of these documents was merely to establish a framework under which the parties would 
attempt to determine the feasibility of the proposed hotel project. Under these 
documents, if the parties determined that the project was feasible, they would then form 
an LLC and negotiate "[a] formal and legal agreement" (Aple. Add. B), i.e., an 
operating agreement for the new LLC (Aplt. Add. 1). 
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However, the parties never determined whether the hotel project was 
feasible. Among other things, newly discovered environmental problems with 
defendants' real property, and Wydredge's unwillingness to address those problems, 
may have prevented development of the property. 
Moreover, even if the parties had determined that the project was feasible, 
they were never able to agree upon the terms of an operating agreement. Negotiations 
regarding the respective contributions, percentage interests, and rights and duties of the 
parties under the proposed LLC were never completed. Accordingly, the new LLC 
was never formed or organized. 
The so-called "parol evidence" Wydredge relies upon as further evidence of a 
binding contract merely highlights the parties' failure to reach a meeting of the minds. 
The reason that defendants never agreed to Wydredge's proposed operating agreement 
was because it was one sided, and the obligations Wydredge purported to undertake 
under that agreement were illusory. Under Wydredge's version of the agreement, it 
could have immediately sold defendants' real property and kept 51 %-65% of any 
proceeds, for no consideration. 
The only parties harmed by the inability to reach agreement were defendants. 
They invested over $49,000 in architect's fees toward the proposed project, and now 
face suit by the architect over Wydredge's failure to pay the remaining half of the 
architect's bill, as Wydredge agreed to do. Wydredge, on the other hand, invested 
nothing. 
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Wydredge recorded the lis pendens against defendants' real property not 
because it claimed a valid interest in the property, but to further harm defendants by 
preventing any other development of their property. Even if Wydredge's constructive 
trust claim provided a colorable basis for the lis pendens, dismissal of this action 
properly resulted in the order that Wydredge release the lis pendens, especially where 
Wydredge's opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment did not argue 
against release of the lis pendens. Wydredge's release of the lis pendens, before 
seeking a stay of the order directing the release in the Supreme Court, waived any 
contention Wydredge makes about the propriety of the District Court Minute Entry 
denying the motion to stay the release filed below. In addition, Wydredge failed to file 
a notice of appeal from the District Court Minute Entry denying its motion to stay the 
release. 
Thus, the District Court's Order and Judgment dismissing this action with 
prejudice, and ordering the release of the lis pendens, as well as the Minute Entry 
denying Wydredge's motion to stay, were proper and should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WYDREDGE'S DECEMBER 1, 1997 LETTER WAS 
TOO VAGUE AND INDEFINITE TO CREATE AN 
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT, AND THE PARTIES 
NEVER REACHED A MEETING OF THE MINDS AS 
TO THE ISSUES THE LETTER LEFT UNRESOLVED. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "[i]t is fundamental that a meeting of 
the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the formation of a 
contract." Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996). 
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"An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite or demonstrate that there 
was no intent to contract." Id. In Tsern, the trial court found that the parties agreed to 
the concept of rent credit, but did not agree as to the amount. Based upon this finding, 
the trial court ruled that it could fix a reasonable amount. 
The Supreme Court overturned the trial court's ruling, reasoning that, "[a] 
valid modification of a contract or lease requires 'a meeting of the minds of the parties, 
which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness.'" 
Id. [quoting Valcarce v. Bitters. 362 P.2d 427 (Utah 1961)]. The Court also stated 
that, ''when parties have not agreed on a reasonable price or a method for determining 
one, 'the agreement is too indefinite and uncertain for enforcement.'" Id. [quoting 
Joseph M. Perillo et al., Corbin on Contracts § 4.3, at 568 (rev. ed. 1993)]. See also. 
Lesslev v. Hardage. 727 P.2d 440, 446 (Kan. 1986). (The general rule is that for an 
agreement to be binding, it must be substantially definite as to its terms and 
requirements as to enable a court to determine what acts are to be performed, and when 
performance is complete, and the court must be able to fix definitely the legal liability 
of the parties.) 
The primary concern related to the enforcement of indefinite contracts is that 
the court, rather than the parties, will be required to create key terms of the agreement. 
The court in Setterlund v. Firestone. 700 P.2d 745, 746 (Wash. 1985) stated that, 
"[t]he legal principle with which we are concerned is that preliminary agreements must 
be definite enough on material terms to allow enforcement without a court supplying 
those terms. The problem is not one of determining how many more terms are 
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included in one agreement or another, but whether a particular agreement includes 
sufficient material terms." In Setterlund, the court refused to require specific 
performance of a promissory note because the parties had not agreed on the amount of 
interest to be paid. 
The court noted that, "the court should not supply those terms upon which 
the parties have not agreed." Id. The Court concluded that, "the buyers had to prove 
the existence of a preliminary agreement which contained terms specific enough to be 
enforced without the court drafting the final documents." Id. See also. Griffin v. 
Griffin, 699 P.2d 407, 409 (Colo. 1985) (Agreements by which parties merely agree to 
negotiate and reach agreement at some future time are ordinarily unenforceable, 
because the court has no power to force the parties to reach agreement and cannot grant 
a remedy); Hauser v. Rose Health Care Systems, 857 P.2d 524, 528 (Colo. App. 
1993), cert.den. 1993 Colo.App. LEXIS 50 (Aug. 30, 1993) (A contract is not 
enforceable if it appears that further negotiations are required to work out essential 
terms). 
Here, like Tsern, the parties entered into preliminary negotiations and 
reached consensus on some basic concepts. However, the Letter which Wydredge is 
attempting to enforce is not definite enough to be enforceable. The parties simply did 
not agree, and in fact disagreed, about many key material terms of the proposed final 
operating agreement. 
For example, defendants' November 20, 1997 memo required the parties to 
agree upon an "exit strategy" (Aple. Add. B). Similarly, Wydredge's December 1, 
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1997 Letter required the parties to agree upon "terms under which one or more 
members may dispose of their interest" (Aplt. Add. 1). It is undisputed that no such 
agreement was ever reached. (Compare Aplt. Add. 3 with Aple. Add. C.) 
Also, both the November 20, 1997 memo and December 1, 1997 Letter 
indicated that in return for a 49% interest in the project, defendants would be required 
to invest no more than their real property and $650,000. However, under Article V of 
Wydredge's proposed operating agreement, defendants could be required to invest 
additional capital in the project, under pain of having their percentage interest in the 
project diluted (Aplt. Add. 3, R. 310). 
Also, according to Wydredge, the parties never reached agreement on 
sharing of initial costs of the project, such as architect's fees. Under the November 20, 
1997 memo and December 1, 1997 Letter, Wydredge was supposed to pay 50%-51% 
of these fees. However, Wydredgefs proposed operating agreement was silent on the 
issue, and Wydredge's position was that it was only required to pay $2,000 of an 
architect's bill that was over $80,000. (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 44-46, 92-94, R. 187-
188; Wyman Depo., pp. 39-42, R. 224-225.) In addition, the Letter was silent upon, 
and the parties never reached agreement as to, a myriad of issues addressed in the 
proposed operating agreements of Wydredge and defendants, respectively. See, 
paragraph 26 of defendants' Statement of Facts above, subparagraphs a. through j . 
Wydredge contends that defendants breached the Letter by attempting to 
change their percentage interest in the proposed project. However, no final agreement 
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on defendants' percentage interest was ever reached. (Aple. Add. B; Aplt. Add. 1; 
R. 382; R. 330-334.) 
It is undisputed that the parties never considered the Letter to be anything 
more than a letter of intent, subject to later negotiation of a formal written contract. 
Defendants' November 20, 1997 memo required a "formal and legal agreement" to be 
executed. Similarly, Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter required the parties to enter 
into an "operating agreement" for the new LLC the parties planned to form.12 
It is similarly undisputed that defendants never agreed to the terms of 
Wydredge's proposed operating agreement. While defendants may have indicated 
agreement in principal, any such agreement was subject to review of the operating 
agreement by defendants' counsel. (Rumpsa Aff., \ 10, R. 173; R. 382.) After their 
counsel's review of Wydredge's proposed agreement, defendants decided to propose 
their own operating agreement, and the parties were never able to reconcile the two. 
(Aple. Add. C; R. 330-334.) 
Any conditional approval of Wydredge's proposed operating agreement by 
defendants did not create a binding contract. Wydredge cites C&Y Corp. v. General 
Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47 (Utah App. 1995) for the proposition that the parties 
need not agree upon all details of a contract in order for it to be enforceable, so long as 
there is agreement upon the essential terms. However, in C&Y Corp. this Court found 
that the alleged contract was not enforceable, in part because one party's agreement to 
12It is also undisputed that the new LLC was never formed or organized because the 
parties never filed the Articles of Organization they signed. See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
48-2b-103(l) and 118(1) 
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the contract was made subject to approval by the party's board of directors. Similarly, 
here, conditional approval of the concept of Wydredge's proposed operating agreement, 
subject to review by defendants' counsel, was not binding. 
Wydredge also cites Nixon and Nixon. Inc. v. John New & Assoc, Inc., 641 
P.2d 144 (Utah 1982) for the same proposition as C&Y Corp.. supra. However, in 
Nixon, the parties had reached agreement on all terms of the contract except the timing 
of performance. The court relied upon law to the effect that where a contract is silent 
as to the time for performance, it will be presumed that the parties intended completion 
of performance within a reasonable time under all the circumstances. Here, it would 
have been impossible for the District Court to have determined "reasonable" terms 
upon which the parties could dispose of their interest in the project, "reasonable" 
percentage interests in the project, or a "reasonable" cost sharing allocation. Instead, 
the District Court would have had to create an agreement the parties themselves were 
never able to reach, which the District Court properly refused to so. See, Setterhmd, 
supra. 
Wydredge cites Shields v. Harris. 934 P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1997) as support 
for using parol evidence to prove an enforceable contract. In Shields, the court was 
able to harmonize two lease and option to purchase proposals. Here, however, the 
parol evidence is merely further evidence of the parties' inability to agree. Neither the 
District Court nor the parties could "harmonize" the two operating agreements 
proposed by the respective parties. (Aplt. Add. 3; Aple. Add. C.) 
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Wydredge's proposed operating agreement (1) omitted terms found in its 
December 1, 1997 Letter (e.,g., the 51%/49% cost sharing), (2) had terms contrary to 
the Letter (e.g., a provision that defendants could be required to make capital 
contributions beyond their real property and initial cash contribution, or have their 
interest diluted), and (3) contained numerous terms not contained in the Letter, upon 
which the parties were never able to agree. See, paragraph 26 of defendants' Statement 
of Facts, above, subparagraphs a. through j . Under Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-126(l), 
the members of an LLC must reach "unanimous consent" upon the terms of an 
operating agreement, which never occurred here. 
The purpose of Wy dredge's December 1, 1997 Letter was to create a 
procedure to determine whether the hotel project was feasible. Paragraph 2 of the 
Letter states: "The feasibility of constructing on this site [defendants' real property] a 
hotel with approximately 100 rooms will be investigated." (Aplt. Add. 1, emphasis 
added.) See also, Rumpsa Aff. \\ 1 and 3, R. 169-170; Wydredge's memorandum in 
opposition to defendants1 motion for summary judgment, p. 5, \ 21, R. 160; 
Appellants' Brief, p. 5. However, no determination of feasibility was ever made. 
While the defendants were attempting to negotiate the terms of the operating 
agreement, defendants discovered solvent contamination that Alamo may not have been 
obligated to remediate, and that may not have been covered by Alamo's indemnity. 
(R. 140, 330-334, 353-366; Parrish Depo. pp. 30-37, R. 210-211; Cutrubus Depo., pp. 
84-85, R. 197.) This solvent contamination may have prevented Wydredge from 
obtaining the financing necessary for the hotel project, as contemplated in Wydredge's 
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December 1, 1997 Letter. (Aplt Add. 1, if 3; Cutrubus Depo., pp. 32-37, 86-87; R. 
184-185, 198.) At the very least, the solvent contamination may have created 
"significant or unusual site costs" that would have prevented development even under 
the Letter.. (Aplt. Add. 1, 1 3; Parrish Depo., pp. 30-37; R. 210-211; R. 330-334.) 
Moreover, Wydredge wanted no part of the solvent contamination. (Cutrubus Depo., 
pp. 87-89, 94-95, R. 198, 200.) 
The only parties hurt by the inability to reach agreement on the terms of an 
enforceable contract were defendants. After the December 1, 1997 Letter was signed, 
Wydredge did not invest one penney in the proposed project. (Wyman Depo., pp. 46-
48, R. 226.) Defendants, on the other hand, invested over $49,000 in architect's fees, 
while still facing suit by the architect, over Wydredge fs failure to pay the remaining 
half of that bill, as it agreed to do. (R. 142.) 
For these reasons, Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter, along with any 
supplementary parol evidence, were too vague and indefinite to create an enforceable 
contract. 
II. WYDREDGE!S OBLIGATIONS UNDER ITS 
DECEMBER 1, 1997 LETTER WERE TOO 
ILLUSORY FOR THE LETTER TO BE 
ENFORCEABLE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "[w]hen there exists only the facade 
of a promise, i.e., a statement made in such vague or conditional terms that the person 
making it commits himself to nothing, the alleged 'promise' is said to be 'illusory'." 
Resource Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc.. 706 P.2d 
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1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). The Court continued: "An illusory promise neither binds the 
person making it, . . . nor functions as consideration in return for the promise." Id. 
[citing 1 Corbin on Contracts § 145 (1963)]. See also, Davis v. General Foods Corp., 
21 F.Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (Where the promissor retains an unlimited right to 
decide the nature or extent of his performance, the promise is illusory and too indefinite 
for legal enforcement); Wharf Restaurant, Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334, 339 
(Wash. App. 1979) (A supposed promise is illusory when it is so indefinite that it 
cannot be enforced, or where its provisions are such as to make its performance 
optional or entirely discretionary on the part of the claimed promissor). 
Here, Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter is illusory in several ways.13 
First, as argued above, the Letter is indefinite and vague. The rights and duties of the 
parties are uncertain and, thus, unenforceable. 
In addition, the Letter is illusory because Wydredge could avoid its 
obligations thereunder at its sole discretion, if it determined that the proposed hotel 
would not generate sufficient profit. (Cutrubus Depo. p. 25-27, R. 182-183.) It was 
also Wydredge's position that it could have immediately sold defendants' real property 
13Defendants argued that the Letter was illusory in their memorandum in support of 
their motion for summary judgment. (R. 67-69.) However, Wydredge never 
responded to this argument in their memorandum in opposition (R. 156-334) and, thus, 
waived any argument on this appeal. See, Strawberry Electric Service District, supra. 
Also, although the District Court did not expressly rule that the contract was illusory, 
the District Court may be affirmed on any ground argued below. See, Salt Lake 
County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1996). 
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and pocketed 51% (or 65%) of the proceeds from the sale, without contributing 
anything to the project. (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 52-55, R. 189-190.) 
Any financing commitment Wydredge alleges it obtained was also illusory, 
because Wydredge never signed the alleged commitment or paid the requisite fees. 
(Cutrubus Depo., pp. 40-41, R. 186.) Also, any such commitment was subject to the 
lender's due diligence, including an appraisal of defendants' real property (which the 
Letter also required) and an environmental assessment, neither of which Wydredge ever 
obtained. (Cutrubus Depo., pp. 27-28, 32-37, 39-40, 66-68, R. 183-186, 193; Wyman 
Depo., pp. 26-28, R. 221.) Consistent with the foregoing, Wydredge never made a 
determination whether to go forward with the project. (Cutrubus Depo., p. 92, R. 
199.) 
Thus, Wydredge's December 1, 1997 Letter was not enforceable for these 
reasons as well. 
III. IT WAS PROPER FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO 
ORDER THE RELEASE OF THE LIS PENDENS 
WYDREDGE RECORDED AGAINST DEFENDANTS1 
REAL PROPERTY AND TO DENY WYDREDGEfS 
MOTION TO STAY THE RELEASE. 
As discussed above, Wydredge never filed a notice of appeal from the 
District Court order denying Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens 
(November 30, 1999 Minute Entry, Aplt. Add. 6). In addition, the issue is moot or 
has been waived by Wydredge because after the District Court denied Wydredge's 
Motion to Stay, Wydredge signed a release of the lis pendens, which defendants 
promptly recorded, well before Wydredge filed its Motion to Stay Release of Lis 
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Pendens Pending Appeal in this Court (Aple. Add. A). See, Ottenheimer v. Mountain 
States Supply Co.. 56 Utah 190, 193, 188 P. 1117, 1118 (1920). For these reasons 
alone, this portion of Wy dredge's appeal must be dismissed. 
Nevertheless, and even though Wydredge also made no argument against 
releasing the lis pendens in opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment, 
defendants will briefly address the merits of the portion of the District Court's Order 
directing that Wydredge release the lis pendens. (Aplt. Add. 4.) Wydredge did not 
record the lis pendens because it was claiming an interest in defendants' real property. 
To the contrary, Wydredge did not want to risk assuming the environmental liability 
that owning an interest in the property might involve. Instead, Wydredge recorded the 
lis pendens in order to prevent other development of the property. (Cutrubus Depo., 
pp. 87-89, 94-95, R. 198, 200.) In addition, dismissal of the action warranted release 
of the lis pendens, especially where Wydredge declined to post a supersedeas bond to 
stay the release. See, Gardner v. Perry. 2000 Ut. App. 1, If 23, 24, 386 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 47.14 Accordingly, the District Court ruled properly on these issues as well. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendants respectfully urge this Court to affirm the 
District Court's Order and Judgment dismissing this action with prejudice, and ordering 
14Further arguments regarding the District Court's denial of Wydredge's motion to stay 
release of the lis pendens are set forth in defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Wydredge's Motion to Stay Release of Lis Pendens Pending Appeal, on file in this 
Court, and will not be repeated here. That motion is currently pending before the 
Court. 
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Wydredge to release the Notice of Lis Pendens recorded against defendants' real 
property, and the District Court's Minute Entry denying Wydredge's Motion to Stay 
Release of Lis Pendens. 
DATED this ^ z day of March, 2000. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By y A^ 9^c? Arf^yi'^L^ 
Joh^P/Ashton ^ 
James-A. Boevers 
Roger J. McConkie 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ;-3 ^  day of March, 2000, I caused the original 
and seven copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to be mailed,, first-class 
postage prepaid thereon, to the Court of Appeals, and two copies to be mailed, first-
class postage prepaid thereon, to the following: 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
5790 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84403 
—^—T~ 
G:\EA\Jab\Parrish, Brent\Appellee's Brief.wpd 
9308-8 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Release of Lis Pendens 
B. Defendants' November 20, 1997 Memo 
C. Defendants' Proposed Operating Agreement 
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Roger J. McConkie (5513) 
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PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 E 4TH S STE.900 
SLC UT 84111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT BY: R0.J, DEPUTY - WI 3 p. 
( 0 0 
UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WYDREDGE, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AIRPORT PARTNERS, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, and J. BRENT 
PARR1SII, individually, 
Defendants, 
RELEASE OF 
LIS PENDENS 
Civil No. 980909956 
Judge Sandra Pueller 
MtlHCe, YEATES 
& aCLDZAHLEft 
Ctly Centre I, Suito 900 
175 E(U1400 SouUi 
S.ill lake City 
Utsh«41Mft 
Comes now the undersigned attorney for plaintiff, Wydredge, L.L.C., and releases 
the Lis Pendens recorded on QcTog.Ee- 5~ 19ji, as Entry No. T 1.0^ 14% Book g\iU , 
Page O&n-'l , in Uic official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder, and affecting the real 
property as described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
DATED this ! 5 ^ a y of January, 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
)•*$-?&&> 
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[page 2 of Release of Lis Pendens in re Wydredge, LLC. v. Airport Partners, LLC, andj, 
Brent Parrish, Civil No, 980909956, in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah] 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss, 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
The foregoing RELEASE OF LIS PENDENS was acknowledged before me this 
S flay of January, 2000, by Brian R. Florence. 
*Y\/3& OoaJaal ££L-
My Commission Expires: 
JTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at:HUJWA (UAJLACJU {jJf~ ^AXfiQilA 
Notary Public 
JOANNTSAKALOS 
1S4'. EAST 6200 SOUTH 
O G D E N . U T 8 4 4 0 3 
My Commiss ion Expires 
NOVEMBER 29, 2002 
STATE OP UTAH 
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EXHIBIT "A1 
PARCEL I: 
Beginning 8.5 feet North and 33 feet West from the South 
quarter corner of Section 33, Township 1 North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 151.04 feet; 
thence West 175.61 feet; thence North 294.22 feet; thence 
West 132.10 feet; thence South 445.26 feet; thence East 
307.71 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL II: 
Beginning 309.54 feet North and 33 feet West of the South 
Quarter corner of Section 33, Township 1 North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and thence North 150 
feet; thence West 175.61 feet; thence South 150 feet; thence 
East 175.61 feet to the place of beginning. 
PARCEL III: 
Beginning 33 feet West and 159.54 feet North from the South 
Quarter corner of Section 33, Township 1 North, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence North 150 feet, 
thence West 175.61 feet; thence South 150 feet; thence East 
175.61 feet to the point of beginning. 
^ ex 
c5» 
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November 20, 1997 
To: Homer Cutmbus 
Phidia Cutmbus 
Barry Eldredge 
Clayton Wyman 
Tim Rampsa 
This is the recap of my immediate impressions of our meeting today. 
L The group consisting of Homer Cutrubus, Phidia Cutrubus, Barry Eldredge, Clayton 
Wyman, and Tim Rampsa et al will represent 51% and Brent Parrish and/or his assigns will 
represent 49% of a joint venture 100 room hotel to be built on the property located at 37 
North 2400 West, Salt Lake City Airport, UT. 
IL Rough terms of this partnership are: a. Parrish will bring the land (valued by this 
agreement at 5850,000.) And $650,000. cash equaling a total maximum investment of 
$1,500,000. and nothing more, including loan guarantees or additional cash assessments, 
for a 49% interest and Cutrubus et al will bring all else needed, ie cash, financing, 
planning, development, building and management for their 51% interest Parah, as good 
faith, is to put 5650.000. on deposit by a date yet to be identified and will pariripate 
50/50 out of this deposit with Cutrubus et al in expenses incurred (architect engineering, 
survey licensing, etc.) up to the first phase of construction. Parrish will aiso subordinate 
the property iree and ciear as the balance of his 49% investment subsequent to his 
$650,000 deposit but as a part of the security to the construction loan and ultimately any 
permanent loan for the hotel 
EH. Cutrubus et al and Parrish have agreed to define an exit strategy for this project based 
upon mutually agreed to nigger mechanisms that would provide for the panners to eiect 
to exit the project in whole or in part. 
IV. Every individual of this partnership will exercise appropriate diligence and commitment to 
the project to msiiTt its success with no remuneration until such time as the business is 
able to generate appropriate income and thus cash distribution beyond fees for 
management. 
V. A formal and legal agreement will be drawn and signed by all members prior to the first 
shovel being turned for this project. 
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May 29, I99S 
Ax-JORT PARTNERS, LLC 
c/bParrish AdZirsagemerzt 
1399 South 700 East Ste. #J 
Salt Lake City. UT8410S 
(801) 467-2887 
Mr. Homer Cutrubus 
Rocky Mountain 
770 W. Riverdale Head 
Ogden, UT 84405 
Dear Homer, 
Re: the last revision cf the operating agreement 
In the spin: cf forming a tme panrersmp m the hotel project proposed at 37-49 >jsrm 2400 West, 
Salt Lake Cry, UT, I send you the revised (5/29/9S) copy of an njwuii w o^ r*~, ^  fnr the 
proposed Imennountam Lodging LLC, partnership o f Airport Fanners LLC andWycredgelJLC, 
evaluate this agreement completely and I ami sure you wSl agree *h*f it «*•* »*?£•« the true 
Barry Jtidredge 
P.S. Endosed to Wydredgeis a died: for 32,000 - repaying that amount for fends emended as 
trrrrifli deposit to Vaiesnner & Cmne Aidatccs for this project. 
; DEPOSITION 
i EXHIBIT 
"oHiB 
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00319 
OPERATING AGREEMENT 
INTERMOLTNTAIN LODCHNG; LX.C 
(Revised 5/29/98) 
TKI5 OPERATING AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is made and emcred imo as of the 
day of , 1598, by and between AIRPORT PARTNERS, U L C , a 
Utah limited liability company ^Airport"), and WYBREDGE* U L . C , a Utah Ttrnr^A r^^Trty 
company C^Y^^S^l (somedme ccEecdveiy referred to as "Members" and bdxvidually as 
"Member7*). 
L 
INTRODUCTION 
The Members have formed a fimftrrf lirbfrry company known as Intermcumam Lodging, 
LJL.C (The "Company**) for the primary purpose c f operating a company to acnire, seH, lease, 
use, own manage, operate, and am 2a every other way upon hotel, motel, and smilar 
accommodations, real piupcily, fxmres, and personal property fntfrferntaf iherem, andSxthe 
purpose of conducing any other lawful busrness- The Members znmally intend to ccnsmict and 
operate ahctel on the Property, as denned herein (the "HoteT). 
EL 
BUSINESS 
Tns principal place ofousmess oftbe Company shall be 1399 S. 700 East, Scare I, Salt 
Lake City UT 841Q5, or such other address to which the business may from time to time be 
moved, 
^DURATIOK 
In accordance with the Utah limited Liability Company Act (the ^ Acf), the term of the 
Company shall commence upon the filing of the Company's articles of ergamzmen wish die Utah 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code and shall conrfnxie for a term of sot to exceed 
SSy (50) years thereafter, unless ug'-.riiiiarrri sooner by operation of law or in accordance with die 
terms 
I 
IV. 
OWNERSHZP/SSARING RATIOS 
The Members agree to share in all profits and Lasses in l ie following cwnermip 
percentages: 
NAME OWNERSHIP/SHARING FgRCPfrT A fi? 
Wydredge 50% 
Airport 50% 
The Members agree that the Company "wiE not issue any a^ rf^ nrprf rrsrssrs in the 
Company without the uraniracrs consent of the Members. 
V . 
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Each parmer will contribute up to a. m2X7T7rrrrn of 2C% in cam or equaraies: such as 1*^ *7 
cf the total projected develops: costs, bouawTT'^ to be no nore fen 60% cf the total costs.' 
Costs to be included are the land, the construction, PF<££, r~grvyrfnr> y^^rr i^r^lnoy ^ d aH 
expenses necessary to the opening of a "suites type~ betel. THs project wiH conform to all of the 
necessary requirements of the brad chosen for a hotel of 100-120 rooms. The total costs of this 
development shall not exceed S5,50O,0OQ. VirVrrr^g the land currently tided to Airport Partners 
which is to be valued zz 51,100,000. see exhibit ~AT hereto (property). Specmc contribution from 
each partner is 51,100,000, Anger: will fend its cu r^> *nnnonwiditfag<<fiee and drrs" pared of 
property as described m!£xhibit*A" (proper^) valued a£ SI,100,000, Wydredge wul coi\L franf f? 
51,100,000. in cash. Both Airport (its principals) and Wydredge (its principals) wffl do whatever 
necessary including personal guarantees to provide the remaining 60% of indebtedness both in the 
form of a. <»nstrucdon loan and permanent finanmng: to the lender yet to be named. 
No sooner *fr^ ^ 
she monrfr? afber the original certificate of occupancy is issued, the 
Members may contribute in arnouTra proportionate to their respective ownership interest in the 
Company any additional capital deirrrH! necessary (by those Members owning at least 51% of the 
interess in the Company) for the operation, as opposed to the construction and/or pemianeut 
•financing, and/or opening, of the Company and/or the Hotel; provided however; that m the event 
that any Member refuses or fails to contribute its proportionate share of any or £L of the 
additional capital, then the other Members or any one of them may contribute the additional 
capital not paid in by such refusing Member and shall receive therefore an increase in 
proportionate share of the ownership or interest hi the entire Company in direct proportion to the 
said additional capital contributed. 
2 
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An Individual capital account shall be maintained for each Member in accordance with 
applicable Treasury Regulations under Section 704 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the 
"Code"). This account: (a) shall be credited wfeh such Member's: (I) original cccniburion of 
capital; (u) addirionai espial coorribuuous; and (Si) allocations to a Member of Company income 
and gain (or items thereof), inrirxftng income and gam exempt from tax and mr-rt^  and crm^  as 
computed for book purposes, in accordance wfe&L Treas. Reg. § l.7G4-l(b)(2XivXg); and (b) «fr*n 
be charged with: (I) any distributions to such Merrher in reducrion of Coxnoairy capital; and (5) 
the Member's share of Comparers losses that are ch^ r&ed to the ^ pji ?[ account of ihe Member. 
VL 
PURPOSE 
The purpose of the Company is to acquire, seS, lease, use, own, ran*** cserate the 
"F^r ,^ and act in every other way upon Hotel, motel, and simitar accommodanens, real property,, 
fixmres, and personal proper^ incidental thereto, T*^ rf to conduct any other Iawml business. 
VTL 
DIVISION OF PROFITS A2sD LOSSES 
Each of the Members 5nr?Tl own an irrrr. est in. the Company as set forth in r2mgnmh IV, 
emitied "Ownership/Sharing Ratios", except as the same may hereafter vary or change as -. 
provided in Paragraph V, enticed "Capita? Coimriby.riocs7*. All proiiis and losses cf the Company 
enterprise be shared by each of said Members according; to the percentage cf imprest each 
Member owns. A separate capital amotTrt shall be mantzaed for each Member. No Member 
*fr*fl make any withdrawals from capital without prior approval of the Members. If the capital 
account of the Member becomes impaired, his share of subsequent Coiapaay proms shall be Srst 
ciedlsgd to his capital anxnrnt Tim! that amciTcc hzs bees restored. 
VIIL 
EKSTS AND DUTTES O F THE PARTIES 
The Members agree to tHTfriaTIy undert?Ve the responsibilities for business operations and 
in thai regard, each shall have a contributory respemsbgmy of time and effort to the Company. 
Company decisions and actions shall be decided by a 51% majority in interest cf ±e Members, at 
meeting regularly called wan notice to ail Members. For purposes of determining a ^ majority hi 
interest", a member's interest will be his interest in promts and losses as set fenh in Paragraph. 
VH, and a majority will mean more than seventy percenr (51%). 
DC 
on: 
MANAGEMENT 
The Comply will pay Emciency Msrrragrrnsrrr, L.L.C, a r m m w n ^ fee in the gmnnnf 
of 4% of gross revenues generated by hotel opcrarioas en a monthly basis for those services anrj 
expertise, and such izanagemeni will be paid* and such Tnanagmre duties wS be rendered 
pursuant to the terns of a wrlnen m7TTT?gemeiir agreement reviewed and approved in form and 
substance by the Members. No management duties win be rendered and no payments there&r 
will be made unu such mffragenrefli agreement has been executed by the pardes. 
MANAGEMENT DUTIES AND RESTRICTIONS 
.Except as provided in Subparagraphs ~B~ and " C of this Secdcc, aH Members 
will have propcrticnate rights in the management of the Company. No Member 
win, wi±cut the consent of the e ther Members, endorse any note or act as an 
acccrrrnr^or pary, or otherwise become sure^r for any person in any 
transacnen involved in the Company. Without the consent of the Germany, no 
Member shall on brrnlfcfthe Company borrow or lend money, cr make, deliver 
or accept any cormcrcial paper, c r execute any mortgage, secumy agreement, 
bond, or lease, cr purchase or ccmracr to purchase, or sdl or comae: to seS any 
property for or cf the Company. N o Member shall, zzzzgz whh ±e consent of die 
ether Members, mortgage, grant a security inrerest in ins share in the Company or 
in the Company capital assets c r pruyei'iy. Neither shaEanyMenberdo any act 
detrhnemal to the best interests of the Company or which would sake it 
impossible to carry on the ordinary purpose of the Company. 
B. The Company nay nom time to thne eEect to designate one of hs Members as 
General Manager for the Company. Such person so designated sail have 
authority to execute all ^rt^mirr^rfr^ zn the name of the Company, except that all 
members shall execute instruments of indebtedness which resporermrry snail not 
be delegned to the Manager. 
C. BairyB.EIdredgejaparmerin^Wydiidge, is hereby designated 2s General 
Manager for apeded of one CI) year from June 1,1998, andthertmer nnnl a 
successor is dected and qualified, t c act hi accordance vnsh the provisions of 
Subparagraph **BW of this part^ and specifically to execute docunscrs in 
conjuncdon with the coostrucdon zixi operation of commercial famines, except a 
limited by the peer paragraph rh^r all Members shall execute icscunents or 
indebtedness. 
D. Barry B. Ehirtdsc, for his one year term* will have management responsibilities 
over the accommedanon aspects o f the business, as weil as aver food and 
beverage sales and related enteraimnenr aspects of the business. 
< 
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James Rumpsa, a Member, shall have the management responsib&ies of the 
Company finances and shall on a monthly baas provide each of the other Members 
with a general arrrnrrnng and current ^n^rtcrnl condition of the Company. 
Any act or omission of the Manager, the effect of which may cause or result in loss 
or damage to the Company or die Members, if done in good feid: to promote die 
best interests of the Company, shall nor subject the Managers to sny EabOiry to the 
Members. 
The Company shall indemnify the Manager and each Member a g» t-.gr excesses 
(branding anotneys' fees), jnrjgffcncrrt3> fees* costs, and all other ST^T^S actually 
and reasonably incurred by such Manager or Member in connecden widi any 
aerial or threatened legal acdon» whether incurred befere or afrertdsi or appeal^  
against die Compaii^ Member arising Som acdvtdes m 
besaifof tSTCompany, OJJZ only i f the Manager or Member acted in good feirii **<* 
in a msrmer it or day reasonably beHeved tc be in or not opposed to die best 
interest of the Company, and with, r e j e c t to any cJnina! acdon,hadno 
reasonable erase to beSevc mch ccrrtTrr was unlawfiii The Company shall 
provide insurance for "errors and omissions" as well as general jfrhrrnffs of 
Manager 2nd Members, 
Trie Manager shall m?se the Conmany t o keep at its principal place cfcusmess the 
following 
(a) a current list in alphabetical order of the full name and last known 
business s&zzz address of each Member; 
(b) a copy of the stamped articles or organization and a& csrdncates of 
arr^n^^r m th^rn^ together with executed copies of any powers 
of attorney pursuant t o 'which any can urate of amendment has 
been executed; 
(c) copies of die Company's federal, state and local income tax returns 
and reports, if any; and 
(d) copies of any fimrTrfnt statements of the Company, if any 
Unless specifically prohibited by the Company's Articles, any aeden required to be 
m\e~i ^r a x?+~™z nrrhe-: Vf^ rt^ o^r r*j- ^h^ 'Memhgrsj or any other acdon which may 
be taV»r at a rr^^g of the Manager o r the Members may be taken without a 
t 5 
Hearing, if a consent in writing, setting farxfrthe acdoxi so tai-*~s shall be signed faj 
the Manager alone or by aEL the Members. Any such consent, icduding the 
elecrioa or replacement of any Manager, signed by all of the Mamser or ail the 
Members owning at least 70% of the interests in the Company shall have the same 
effect as a unanimous vote, and may be stared as such in any document filed with 
any governmental agency or provided to anyone dse. 
XL 
BANKING 
All fern?* n f the Cotrpgrry shall h e rfgpo<£tf~i m rr<g ngTrw in <nigh rhirfrfog ?~~?^z or 
accounts as shaJH^e^^^Trr^'by^^Mesbers^ AE~w5£ifaiwais therefrom art xa be made upon 
checks which must be signed by two representatives designated by the Member 
XIL 
BOOKS 
The Company's books snail be kept at the cfinces of inrermountahi Lccgm^ U L C on a 
calendar year basis in accordance widi the generally accepted accounting principles andshaEbe 
closed and balanced atthe end or each year. Ammrf^t 5rr?TT be rmde as of thericmg<farc,bya 
firm of certified public accounts sdected by the Members owning at Least 51%cf me mterests in 
the Company. Each of the names to this Agi eesxesc hereby covcriCTts and agrses to cause all' ^ 
known business transacdens perminingto the Compamy to be entered properfyanc completely 
frrrn y»*ri books. The Company wiE furnish jmrrrraf Snamcial statements to the Members, and 
• prepare tax renirns at leas two weeks prior to the tax return due date cr any oily crrrrtrf erf dne 
date, furnishing copies to a£ Members at least two weeks befere ±27 are filed and aser they are 
filed by the Company 
XEIL 
INSURANCE 
During the term of the Company's existence, the Company shall carry SabSsy rrreirancg? in 
such arnr.i?^ r^  as are **—*>* appropriate unammoxisiy by the Members. 
6 
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xrv. 
VOLUNTARY TERMINATION 
Tne Company cay be dissolved ar any time by agreement of all the Member, in which 
evenr the Members shall proceed v/irh reasonable promptness to liquidate the Cccmany. The 
assets of the Company shall be issued and distributed in the following order: 
A. To pay or provide for the payment o f all Company KahTmies to credhcrs otherthan 
Members and Equidare cxprrscs and obligations; 
B. To pay debts owing to Members in respect to original *M s^bsecuem 
contribudens of capital; and 
C To pay debts owing Members in resteer to promsin ownership shares-as-idsndned 
"in" paragraph IV of this t 
X V . 
WITHDRAWAL OF MEMBER BY SALE 
Any Member-who shall be desirous of seHrrg his share and interest in the Company *^ *fl 
give the right of first refusal to ai Members other than the seSmg Member to purmase said share 
yrH \nr*rr*r rr rh* pr^ c** gfrn?? rn *am ATM? nrrg ^ T ^ r r m e ^ T ^ average grrgg; tavwiit^ r\r*i\ n^yrprf 
fadSdes and operariocs fcrthe previous two years, cr o n such other terms as are =m»0y 
agreeable. Such revenues shall be verified by audit end determined usng generally accepted 
accounting principies and da accrual method o f acrgyrrT^rrg: Each member decdng to purchase 
T^ e ieHisg member's share and Interest shall have tbe right to purchase that percemage cf the. • 
share being sold which is equal to the result o f dividing his respective per^-iMgr of the Company 
by the total percentage of all Members eJecnrrgr to purch^rse such share and interest. 
X V L 
DEATH OF A MEMBER 
In the event of the deadi of a Member the remaining Members shall have the apnea to 
purchase the demyri Member's share and interest from the deceased's heir orliers. If one or 
more Members elect to purchase the deceased Member's share and interest, the deceased's 
"interest shail be valued and scid in accordance wi ih the previsions ofParagraph XVT enided 
••Withdrawal ofMember by Sale" and the proceeds distributed to. the heir or hers Tvimxa ninety 
(90) days of an elecdon by the remaining Member or Members to purchase such share interest. If 
the dzrr^2«?iz share and Imeresr is net sold, the Ccrnpamy shall, as soon as practicable, provide a 
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docmneai by which the heir or heirs personally affirm and accept all die terms, ccndidons and 
provisions of this Operadng Agreement binding themselves to the ^m^ in wrinng, and select a 
designated rcpresenradve of the deceased Member as an acting Member in Hs place. 
XVIL 
DISSOLUTION 
The term of die Company shall be as set forth, herein; provided, however, that 
Company shall be dissolved and d^reafter terminated eariier upon: 
(a) Any dispesmon by the Compa-ny (other that a conveyance to fcocrance) cfits 
—entire-interest ^substantially all c£the Company property, mrrrr^g 2S mortgages, 
leasehold interest*, stock, securities o r other property (other thai cash) which may 
be acquired by tie Company in exchange therefore, except for the planned sale of 
some or ail of the m±s beared at t h e subject property; 
CD) Except to die extent prohibited by law, the unanhnous decision of ±e Members to 
terminate the Company, 
(c) Tne period fixed for the duranoti of the Company shall expire pmsuant to the 
tenns hereof; and 
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision c f this Agreement, however, so dissolution 
shall occur if any Member ether than an individual Memher Is dissolved for any 
reason, and notwidistsndhig the provisions in the ArddeXTV, upon the 
occurrence of an event of msschidoii described herein or otherwise, aoj of the 
Members holding 21 least 50% of the Irrevests In the Company shall have die right 
to continue the business of the Company within nine^r (90) days after nie_ 
occurrence of die event of dissolution. The business of the Company *-*? sho 
cornmie m the r/^m cf a dbsolmion b y the exercise of a certain purchase option 
gryrrr^ tn th.* f!n»iM^iiy anrf the* \ f f f T t h g T S hgr~2rrr?er. I f t h e t i gh t X COfiTJnTIC IS 
not excrds^d, the Company's aiT r^? g. shnU be wcund up as provided herem and in 
the Act. 
In the event of disschnicn, the Company's afEairs shall be wound down reasonable 
promptness, and the Company's assets shaft be distributed, after paying all 
Company debts and ofaEgaiions, to the Members in accordance wi± the Act and 
generally accepted anccunring principles. 
S 
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VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT 
Any Member wno shall viakrj* *Trt, ~*vu _^ 
• caadiactB of this 
IN" WITNESS WEERSOF, the names h » « v 
fe above wnrtc ^ ^ ^ B e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
AIRPORT PARTNERS, LLC 
A L ^ L S c d l S i r y C ^ D a n v ^ ^ D R E D ^ - L i ^ 
A U t 2 2 t
 ^ ^ LiaMfey Ccasa^ 
oy^ 
. — . frr 
JAMESSRFVT'PA'P^TCTT »/• • — 
nr> o o n 
